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1 Mark Neufeld, The Restructuring of In ternational Relations Theory, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1995), 24.
2 Such engagements are derived from  and informed by  aspects of post-positivist, post-structural, post-colonial,
aboriginal, deep ecological, and (eco) feminist knowledge(s). However, I do not wish to suggest that I am speaking
for/to the people positing/formulating  these projects/life-ways. If pushed, I would  assert that I am speaking  with
these perspectives both  as a vo ice of support and dissent.
3 Indeed, much the following discussion focuses on meta-theoretical engagement and contestation, which despite the
assertions made below may not appear overly relevant to the theorizing let alone the practice of International
Relations. As such , I will work to develop linkages between my assertions and those of H ugh  Gusterson , Philip
Green, and V. Spike Peterson and Anne Sisson Runyan. Likewise, I work to mitigate the violence(s)  caused by my
assertions through processes of critical reflection, which ironically owe an intellectual debt to Neufeld’s notion of
theoretical reflexivity. As my first reflective action, I undertake a project to italicize words/phrases so as to signify a
contestability of meanings and/or the presence of underlying assumptions (meta-theoretical/politico-normative) that
are not properly my own assumptions. This project is undertaken with recognition of the limits of discourse, which
constrains m y ability to em ploy a syntax that accurately portrays the contentions to be made below.
4 Mario Bunge, Finding Philosophy in Social Science, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 6.
5 Donald W. Fiske, and Richard A. Shwedder, “Introduction: Uneasy Social Science,” in Donald W. Fiske, and
Richard A . Shwedder, eds., Metatheory in  Social Science Pluralisms and Subjectivities, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986), 3.
The purpose of the following paper is to critically engage Mark Neufeld’s claim, “it is only by exposing
the limitations of positivism that a space can be created for alternative forms of theorizing about
international politics.”1 My engagement of this statement involves three related assertions.2 Firstly, I
contend that one can construct an effective argument that reaffirms – and indeed is inflected with – post-
positivist assertions that exposing the ‘limitations of positivism’ will create the necessary space for
‘alternative forms of theorizing’. However, I also argue that Neufeld’s construction of theoretical
reflexivity explicitly/implicitly works to (re)ontologize a dichotomous relationship between positivist
and post-positivist approaches to International Relations. Hence, I challenge the potential to which
Neufeld’s conceptions can work as space clearing exercises so long as such exercises proceed through a
dichotomized framing process.3 
Why Does Meta-Theory Matter?
Before delving too far into critique, I believe it is first important to articulate why meta-theoretical
engagement of positivist or post-positivist assumptions matters for International Relations theorizing.
From an essentialist view, meta-theory matters because epistemological, ontological, semantical, logical,
axiological, methodological, and ethical questions/answers underwrite all theoretical projects.4
Consequentially, meta-theoretical assumptions have a “decisive influence on what problems” are
selected for study and how such problems are investigated and conceptualized; thereby opening up or
closing down avenues for substantive theory.5 For instance, Neufeld suggests, “there is a fundamental
link between epistemology – the question of what counts as ‘reliable knowledge’– and politics: the
problems, needs, and interests deemed important and legitimate by a given community for which
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Positivism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13.
8 For such a challenge see, Rudolph Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphsyics Through Logical Analysis of
Language,” in  A.J. Ayer, ed., Logical Positivism, (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), 60-81., K.J. Holsti, “Mirror, Mirror
on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?,” International Studies Quarterly, 33 (1989), 255-61;
Alexander Rosenburg, “Philosophy of Science and Potentials for Knowledge in the Social Sciences,” in Fiske,
Donald W. and Shw edder, Richard  A., eds., Metatheory in  Social Science Pluralisms and Subjectivities, (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 339-45; and Theda Skocpol, “The Dead End of Metatheory,” Contemporary
Sociology, 16 (1987), 10-12.
9 Smith, “Positivism and Beyond ,” 11. 
10 See N eufeld, The Restructuring of International Relations Theory, 22-38; and Smith , “Positivism and Beyond ,”
11-44.
11 Michael Nicholson , “The Continued Significance of Positivism ?” in Steve Smith , Ken  Booth, M arysia  Zalewski,
eds., International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 128.
‘reliable knowledge’ is being sought.”6 Similarly, Steve Smith notes that defining common sense is the
ultimate act of political power and thus, debates about epistemology are very significant for political
practice “[Meta]theories do not simply explain or predict, they define not merely our explanatory
possibilities but also our ethical and practical horizons.”7
Although presenting a view of meta-theoretical relevance that I find rather convincing, these
articulations should not be accepted as unproblematic. For example, there is a substantive body of
authors who do indeed challenge the relevance of meta-theoretical debates.8 However, space constraints
limit my ability to properly address issues raised by these authors. Nonetheless, the challenge(s)
emerging from post-positivists entail contestation of the positivist meta-theoretical assumptions
employed by orthodox International Relations theorists. Hence, it is perhaps most appropriate to proceed
remembering that my dominant frame of reference is markedly post-positivist inspired. 
The Post-Positivist Challenge
Through a post-positivist lens, “positivism’s …empiricist epistemology has determined what could be
studied because it has determined what kinds of things existed in international relations.”9 What is
known and how it is known in mainstream International Relations is thus, determined and obtained
through processes of inquiry involving verifiably observable facts – truth as correspondence.10 Put
another way, positivist epistemologies allow for “generalizations about the social world, including our
particular interest, the international system, which are verifiable.”11 Ascertaining such verifiable facts
relies upon an assumption of a rigid separation between knower-known, subject-object, fact-value, and
theory-practice. This process of positivist ontologizing allows positivist intellectual projects to
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16 Ken Booth , Strategy and Ethnocentrism, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 28
17 I believe gender, race, and environment are the three theoretical/praxis areas which have been most excluded and
simultaneously most impacted by positivist/western metaphysical onotologized dichotomies and notions of
‘science’.  
18 Neufeld , The Restructuring of In ternational Relations Theory, 42.
19 J. Anne Tickner, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 21.
20 Neufeld , The Restructuring of International Relations Theory, 42.
“distinguish what is foundational and real from what is merely ephemeral and superficial.”12 Put to use,
these dichotomous separations also allow positivist theorists to claim a position/site of objectivity. As
Zalewski and Enloe note, “This understanding of the world allows the possibility of thinking that
defining specific referents or identities as central issues in international relations theory is not a
particularly political or epistemologically significant act.”13
For Neufeld, these processes and understandings involve a positivist quest for scientific
knowledge in which all judgement on and influence by values is expatiated. Therefore, scientific inquiry
is concerned with the factual, objective, known, and observable realm, which judiciously avoids
“pronouncing upon or being influenced by” the normative and subjective realm.14 Moreover, the
knowledge ascertained through scientific inquiry/positivist methodology occupies “an extra-historical
natural realm” or is considered as “Nature’s Own”.15 However, post-positivists contend that claims to ‘an
extra-historical natural realm’ of knowledge work to depoliticize the events and practices that exist both
inside/outside a positivist international realm in that, “If something is ‘natural’ people tend to think there
is little point worrying about it.”16 Hence, questions regarding gender, race, and environment,17 for
instance, which have not occupied the purview of orthodox International Theory may not be answered let
alone asked.18
In regards to a generalized and essentialized response, post-positivists purport a perspective,
which entails a rejection of positivist assumptions insofar as “all knowledge is socially constructed and
is grounded in the time, place, and social context of the investigator.”19 For Neufeld, post-positivist
projects work to undermine “the assumption that it is ever possible to separate subject (the knower) and
object (the known) in the manner postulated by positivism.”20  And for Neufeld, theoretical reflexivity
serves this post-positivist purpose through processes of: 
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(i) self-consciousness about underlying premises, 
(ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-normative dimension of paradigms and the
normal science tradition they sustain, and 
(iii) the affirmation that reasoned judgements about the merits of contending paradigm
are possible in the absence of a neutral observation language.21
Accordingly and most importantly, theoretical reflexivity pushes International Relations theorists
to “understand that the standards which determine what is to count as reliable knowledge are not
nature’s, but rather always human standards – standards which are not given but made, not imposed by
nature, but adopted by convention by the members of a specific community.”22 It is through these
challenges of positivist scientific knowledge/inquiry and artificial separations of subject-object and
value-fact, for instance, that Neufeld and post-positivists make their strongest and most pertinent
arguments. Indeed, as will be argued further on, the continued construction and employment of binary
structures by both positivists and post-positivists works to limit the space in which international
theorizing can take place. However, it is important to further destabilize positivist pretensions to pursue
value-free scientific inquiry through, albeit, a brief discussion of the perspectives of V. Spike Peterson
and Anne Sisson Runyan, Philip Green, and Hugh Gusterson. I believe that this discussion further
demonstrates the potential importance that post-positivist contentions pose to mainstream International
theorizing.
Peterson and Runyun, Green, and Gusterson
Termed as the ‘power of gender’, Peterson and Runyan note, “[G]ender thus influences not only who we
are, how we live, and what we have, but also “how” we think , order reality, and claim to know what is
true , and, hence, how we understand and explain the social world.”23 Accepting Peterson and Runyun’s
claims, the ‘power of gender’ is thus ideationally/materially significant to the study of international or
global politics. Gender or gendered notions/practices are not simply present in the notions/practices of
global politics, such as the global sex tourism industry,24 but are also formed and maintained by the
agents/structures who engage in such notions/practices.  However, positivist attempts to pursue or claims
of the capability to pursue value-free scientific inquiry “mask the power of gender (along with other
entrenched systems of oppression) to shape the production of knowledge.”25 In other words, positivistic
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pursuits displace the role that notions/practices of masculinity and femininity play in forming,
maintaining or challenging the notions/practices which constitute the international or global political
realm. The resultant effect is the creation of a view that “international relations is gender neutral or that
women are not part of the subject matter at all.”26
It is therefore ironic that positivist International Relations portends to pursue scientific inquiry
inasmuch as notions/practices of science of scientific inquiry are intimately imbued with gender(ed)
notions/practices. For instance, Peterson notes ‘scientific reasoning’ was explicitly located in the male
and was explicitly promoted as “superior and exclusive of that which was marked as
female/nature/feminine.”27 In this sense, “[M]an positioned himself in “the world” as “knower” and
agent/subject, categorically separated from woman as “known” and object.”28 Accordingly, this process
(re)affirmed the subordination of women.29 Although in this instance Peterson does not provide an
explicit contestation of the capability to pursue value-free scientific inquiry, Peterson does provide the
basis from which to claim that pretensions to value-free scientific inquiry can be seen as gendered
pretensions which privilege and link perceived masculine traits with science and reason while
subordinating and linking perceived feminine traits with nature or natural. Therefore, claims to the
gender free or the neutral status of International Relations ironically denies the ‘power of gender’ by
evoking and practicing an intimately gendered concept. Moreover, to engage or conceptualize value-free
scientific inquiry as gendered allows/creates space for Peterson and Runyan’s claim that, “[B]ecause
inquiry is a social practice and so is always value-laden, it is incumbent on inquirers to critically examine
their social locations and values that arise from them.”30 Indeed, a crucial element of post-positivist
projects – Neufeld included.
Although the audibility of engagements with the ‘power of gender’ is somewhat recent to
International Relations scholarship, challenges to the [orthodox] study of security, strategy, and war can
be traced to time when behaviouralism dominated International Relations. Emerging in 1966 almost two
decades before the ‘Third Great Debate’, I believe Phillip Green provides a significant contestation of
positivist inspired deterrence theories/policies. Green asserts that deterrence theorists are “constantly
assuming away” the most pertinent questions “in the field of inquiry being investigated”; whereby
deterrence theorists “attempt to fit” what are “essentially political questions into the strait jacket of so-
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34 Green, Deadly Logic, 260.
35 Ibid., 265.
36 Ibid. It should  be noted that Green does make a statem ent that appears to contradict this one. In reference to
Deterrence theorists, Green states that they do “exactly the  opposite of what genuine scientists in  any field actually
do (263).” This phrase does work to detract from Green’s earlier contentions and does work to bound a space-
clearing exercise. In noting this I do not wish to suggest that Green’s critique should be discarded or considered any
less relevant. Rather I offer this as sympathetic critique, in hopes that those drawing upon Green can avoid making
similar statements thereby making such critiques m ore persuasive. 
called scientific analysis.”31 As such, deterrence theorists and by implication deterrence theory succumbs
to the vice of “depoliticalization of the political”.32 Accordingly, “theorizing of this type” is unpersuasive
because “policy proposals [the ends of deterrence theory] rest on assertions about politics, and such
assertions consist primarily of complex and indissoluble political judgments.”33 Put another way, “the
notion that we can distinguish between the factual and the evaluative parts of political judgment is
useless.”34
Having questioned the ontological separations effected by deterrence theorists, Green moves to a
direct questioning of the possibility of value-free scientific inquiry in the social sciences. He contends
that “what is more important and disturbing” is that it appears that deterrence theorists “genuinely
imagine themselves to be unable to make meaningful statements unless these be cast in the form of
‘scientific’ propositions”.35 What Green is describing is the deterrence theorist’s belief in the possibilities
of positive knowledge. Hence, Green is challenging notions of positivist epistemology. On its own this
assertion, though important, is not the most critically engaging of Green’s contentions in regard to the
discussion at hand. Such a challenge does come when Green pushes the validity of notions of a social
science by writing: think we can say without question that it is fallacious to think that scientific
propositions (and what exactly they may be is still an open question) are the only epistemologically
meaningful statements.36
In terms of an epistemological challenge this is an important contestation for post-positivist
projects. Green’s epistemic challenge perhaps works to open the door for new or more precisely
marginalized knowledge(s) to enter the realm of strategic studies and deterrence theorization. More
importantly, Green not only contests the epistemic boundaries of positivism and works to create space,
he also resists closing that space off and leaves it open for further contestation. In doing this Green is
presenting a notion that is not appropriately post-positivist, but at the least antithetical to positivist
conceptions of epistemology.
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The extent to which Green’s contestation effected change in the study of security, strategy, and
war is demonstrated by Hugh Gusterson’s statement that, “the core inter-disciplinary dialogue in security
studies in the 1980s was between political scientists and physical scientists, the epistemology of security
studies was deeply positivist and its vocabulary was inflected with idioms of physics…and economics.”37
However, this should not be received as working to negate the significance of Green’s challenges. Rather
I believe that Gusterson’s claim signifies the ability of positivist inspired security/strategic studies to
develop an insular community of knowledge capable of deflecting or defending against challenges or
challengers. Nonetheless, Gusterson also provides a pertinent critical (re)insertion into positivist inspired
security/strategic studies.
In “Missing the End of the Cold War”, Gusterson chastises orthodox strategic studies
theorists/experts for doing exactly that – missing the end of the Cold War. As Gusterson contends,
mainstream security studies failed to achieve its own “positivist modes of argumentation, deterministic
analysis, and predictive accuracy” by not being able to see or more importantly predict the end of the
Cold War.38 Gusterson attributes this failure to the dominant discourse of positivistic security studies that
“embodied a “Cold War narrative” in which drama and meaning derived from an unending, but
constantly shifting, clash between two global empires, and from the repeated introduction of new
technological possibilities and threats into the story line.”39 In other words, positivistic security studies
did not and could not predict the end of the Cold War because the logics of the discourse(s) that were
employed assumed that the Cold War had no or would not end. However, and surprisingly to Gusterson,
positivistic security studies “refused to be chastened by the fact that their assumptions were so
spectacularly contradicted by events.”40 Much like Green, Gusterson attributes such refusal to a situation
in which, “the practitioners [of Cold War discourse] are trapped within the enclosed circularity of their
own self-validating logic. Every conclusion is entailed with the theory’s premises, although a finely
wrought filigree may be spun between one and the other.”41 As such, practitioners of positivistic security
studies are able to explain away the end of the Cold War or their inability to predict the end of the Cold
War without having to [critically] reflect upon their (meta)theoretical commitments. 
Read ironically, Gusterson’s contentions engage/expose positivistic pretensions not as value-free
pretensions but as intimately normative pretensions. Assuming the pursuit of scientific knowledge
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requires the rigours of scientific investigation, how can/could practitioners of positivistic security studies,
as described by Gusterson, maintain pretensions to scientific inquiry if they were not willing to accept
that in the context of the Cold War their explanatory theories failed. It is not my purpose to engage
individual justifications, although as with Gusterson this could prove to be a fruitful endeavour. Rather, I
want to suggest that the maintenance or continued prevalence of positivistic studies of security signifies
the value which practitioners of positivism place on such studies. Much like Peterson and Runyan,
Gusterson and Green provide a basis from which to claim that ironically the pretension to value-free
scientific inquiry is underwritten by normative commitments to the value of value-free scientific inquiry. 
For Neufeld and other post-positivist contentions, this above discussion provides both substance
and space. Indeed, the above formulations adopt somewhat of a positivistic tone in their argumentative
stance.42 In this sense, the claims of Peterson and Runyan, Green, and Gusterson provide substance; these
perspectives provide a normative/empirical base from which post-positivist contestations can be
launched. Likewise, Peterson and Runyun, Green, and Gusterson, if not explicitly, implicitly (re)affirm
the necessity of the post-positivist pronouncement to “provide new intelligibilities and alternative
possibilities for the field.”43 Having said this, it is now important to problematize the potential to which
Neufeld and by implication post-positivist exercises work to create a wider ‘thinking space’ for
alternative possibilities. I intend to pursue this problematizing by engaging explicit/implicit instances in
which post-positivism/reflexivity is construed as opposing or in opposition to positivism.
(Re)Constructing a Pole/(Re) Asserting a Binary
In perhaps one of the most explicit post-positivist binary assertions, Wayne Cox and Claire Turenne
Sojlander suggest, “[h]ow we approach theory becomes the central question, and the central dichotomy
becomes one between positivist and postpositivist, or theoretically reflexive, avenues.”44 Indeed the
language and the assertion are quite strong. However, to accept this discourse as neutral and to view this
as a typical post-positivist assertion would be to contradict the core tenets of theoretical reflexivity along
with my own commitments. It is therefore imperative that I pursue a critical investigation regarding how
Neufeld constructs theoretical reflexivity. As such, the process through which Neufeld develops a binary
(re)construction involves three instances, an explicit oppositional (re)construction of reflexivity and
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positivism, an explicit relational (re)construction of reflexivity and positivism, and an implied
essentialized (re)construction of the ‘other’ – positivism. For heuristic purposes, each of these instances
will be treated in turn.
There are two instances in which Neufeld most explicitly construes reflexivity as an oppositional
pole to positivism. For example, Neufeld notes that the second and third tenets of theoretical reflexivity
“makes reflexivity a virtual antonym of positivism.”45 Similarly, according to Neufeld, “a theoretically
reflexive orientation is one whose starting point stands in radical opposition to that of positivism in that
it rejects the notion of objective standards existing independently of human thought and practice.”46 In
usage, opposition and antonym presume that something has something to be opposed to or to be an
antonym of and thus, positivism and reflexivity can be seen to be located at the poles of an oppositional,
dichotomous, or binary structure – relationship. 
In terms of developing relational instances Neufeld is most explicit insofar as he uses a variation
of the term ‘relate’ on three occasions. Regarding how he will fully define the notion of reflexivity,
Neufeld writes, “I will do this by relating the core elements of reflexivity to the positivist understanding
of theory and knowledge”.47 Similarly, Neufeld proposes that his exercise to elaborate the three core
tenets of reflexivity entails that each tenet “be related to the positivist conception of theory and
knowledge.”48 Lastly and in specific reference to the third tenet, the possibility of reasoned evaluation in
the absence of a neutral discourse, Neufeld states, “Once again, this element of reflexivity can best be
understood in relation to positivism.”49
As mentioned above, the purpose of articulating oppositional and relational instances was
heuristic, in that I intended to separate these constructions so as to explicitly expose and clearly present
citations in which Neufeld constructs reflexivity and positivism as both relational and oppositional.
However, moving beyond heuristic purposes, I want to suggest that a separation of oppositional and
relational constructions is perhaps inappropriate insofar as the construction of an oppositional binary
contains an underlying assumption of a relationship – an oppositional relationship. In this sense, Neufeld
has (re)constructed notions that are mutually exclusive and simultaneously mutually constitutive. In
other words, “each idea is forever producer and product of its polar opposite, since each is imbued with
meaning as much by what it is not as by what it is.”50 
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Neufeld provides a pertinent example of this statement in his description of what theoretical
reflexivity is not:
Reflexivity is not a ‘research programme’ designed to provide cumulative knowledge
about the world of empirical facts or about the world of theory. Nor can reflexivity be
reduced to the idea that while agreement on facts is possible, value disagreements will
continue to plague scholars in their quest for disciplinary consensus. Finally, reflexivity
does not provide a priori standards or criteria for assessing the merits of contending
paradigms.51
Accepting that binaries are both mutually exclusive and constitutive, this paragraph is simultaneously a
description of what reflexivity is not and what positivism is. Furthermore, this articulation works to
construct an essentialized definition of what is (not) positivism and what is (not) reflexivity.
(Re)Ontologizing Exclusion
Assuming for the moment the possibility of a neutral discourse, Neufeld almost undeniably construes
theoretical reflexivity as opposing or more precisely in opposition to positivism. Therefore, this
exercise/process appears to be (re)ontologizing separation. What I am proposing is that by constructing
reflexivity and positivism as a binary, Neufeld makes real the possibility that knowledge realms can be
dichotomously separated. Likewise, Neufeld’s exercise also works to make real or (re)ontologize
reflexivity and positivism in that each notion becomes a pole/place/site which can be claimed for
purposes of identity.52 I believe that three pertinent potentialities emerge from this process of
(re)ontologizing.53 
Firstly, and to be only briefly discussed, are the possibilities that (re)ontologizing positivist and
post-positivist perspectives works to (re)discipline/(re)affirm the boundaries of International Relations
theorizing/practicing. By this I want to suggest that post-positivist challenges work for inclusion within
the meta-theoretical boundaries of International Relations without a challenging of the politico-
normative assumptions that maintain the boundary altogether. As such, a post-positivist (re)disciplining
of International Relations works to reify exclusionary knowledge(s) of professionalism and the academy.
Reification of such knowledge(s) does indeed work to limit post-positivist calls for a wider ‘thinking
space’ within the study of International Relations theory/praxis.54 
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Secondly and again only to be briefly addressed, constructing knowledge realms through a
dichotomized framing process works to bound/insulate/solidify/essentialize the poles of a dichotomy and
thus, obscure complex relations between those entities/occurrences which are identified with a particular
pole. For instance, the functioning(s) of a masculine-feminine binary has worked to conflate a gendered
identity with a sexed identity. Furthermore, a masculine-feminine binary can also work to promote
notions of hegemonic masculinity and hegemonic femininity in which, hegemonic masculinity is
associated with “autonomy, sovereignty, objectivity, universalism, the capacity for reason/abstraction”
while hegemonic femininity is associated with absence of all these qualities.55 In this instance, hegemonic
gendered notions can work to obscure “differences in the politics of masculinity [femininity] between
countries – and between ethnic groups in the same country.”56 
Applying this scenario to Neufeld and post-positivists, a reflexivity-positivism binary opens the
space for the development of hegemonic notions of what it is to be reflexive and/or positive; thereby
creating practices/situations of possible exclusion within both polar realms. Moreover, construing
reflexivity and positivism as a binary also seems to (re)affirm the viability if not the legitimacy of these
(non)practices that have most perniciously excluded and marginalized a variety of peoples and
knowledge(s). Therefore, the presence of a “dichotomized framing process” works to create “unhelpful
polarities and over-simplified categorizations” that may further obscure alternative
possibilities/potentialities for ‘theorizing about international politics’.57
Thirdly, the exercise of binary construction can also work to exclude/marginalize knowledge(s)
and people(s) through processes of mapping and (de)privileging. Mapping and (de)privileging processes
entail the alignment and subsequent unitary identification of a desired set of polar oppositions, “so that
each becomes one with a privileged self.”58 Remembering the mutually exclusive/constitutive
relationship of binaries, processes of mapping and (de)privileging also work to identify non-desired poles
as a corruption of the idealized self – a denigrated other.59 Exclusion(s) or perhaps more appropriately
violence(s) occur through the engagement of the oppositional identities inasmuch as the
desired/privileged.
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60 As will be briefly addressed in the concluding section, it is Neufeld’s unawareness of the potentials for exclusion
in his own notions/articulations that works as the most important detraction.
61 See George, “Realist ‘Ethics’, International Relations, and Post-Modernism,” Peterson, “Security and Sovereign
States,” and R.B.J. Walker, “State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time,” Millennium, 20
(1991), 445-61, for discussion of the influence of modern  philosophy on International Relations.
62 Gender, race, and environment have been/are perhaps the most perniciously effected theorized and practiced
realms of moderned  inquiry. For a pertinent discussion see J. Marshall Beier, “Beyond Hegemonic State(ment) s of
Nature: Aboriginal Life Ways and The Tyranny of Orthodox International Relations Theory,” in Geeta Chowdhry
and Sheila Nair, eds., Power, Postcolonialism, and International Relations: Reading Race, Gender, and  Class,
(London: Routledge, 2002), 82-114 . 
As mentioned above, Neufeld’s exercise works to (re)ontologize reflexivity-positivism in that
each notion becomes a place/site which can be claimed as a polarized identity. Underlying and
supporting this dichotomized identity is a further set of dichotomous structures – self awareness of
underlying assumptions-truth as correspondence, politico-normative inflection-objective scientific
inquiry, (con)text-extra historical natural realm. Signified by Neufeld’s discourse, the engagement
between these identities occurs through radical opposition and rejection of positivist identity structures
by reflexive identity structures. Through this framing process, Neufeld’s notion can now be seen to carry
an underlying assumption of exclusion – which he does not appear to be aware of.60 
Indeed each of these possibilities works to demonstrate an exclusionary and marginalizing
potential that a reflexivity-positivism dichotomy possesses. Moreover, each possibility implicitly
addresses/challenges the excluding processes of what has been variously identified as modern(ed),
enlightenment(ed), and western(ed) philosophy/meta-physics.61 Therefore, theoretical reflexivity
may/does work to expose the limitations of positivism. However, in attempting to expose the limits of
positivism, Neufeld does not address modern(ed) excluding tactics, while simultaneously undertaking an
exercise in knowledge construction that appears to be inherently modern(ed) – constructing
dichotomized knowledge/praxis realms. 
Accepting the presence of modern(ed) knowledge exercises subsequently requires that Neufeld
must come to terms with the exclusionary, marginalizing, and pernicious knowledge(s) and practice(s) of
a modern(ed) International Relations. Neufeld attempts to do this through an engagement of positivist
meta-theory. However, positivist inflected International Relations is perhaps not the essential
modern(ed) notion that has limited/bounded the theorizing and practicing of International Relations.
Contesting positivist meta-theory does indeed work to clear/make a space for alternative theorizing and
Neufeld and post-positivists present an effective contestation. Nonetheless, post-positivist theorizing
appears to clear a space which has been and continues to be modern(ed).62 That is post-positivists,
especially Neufeld, appear to challenge knowledge(s) and practice(s) within International Relations
without challenging the knowledge(s) and practice(s) that maintain International Relations as a
legitimate site of knowledge production. Therefore, without an acknowledgement of the limiting and
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63 David Campbell, Writing Security: Us Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1992), 4.
64 R.B.J. Walker, “State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time,” Millennium, 20 (1991), 458.  
65 See Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defence Intellectuals,” Signs: Journal of Women in
Culture and Society , 12 (1984), 687-718, for a discussion of the limiting/transforming effects of dominant
discourse(s). 
66 This must be qualified . For th is paper, the number of works or chapters under review is very lim ited and thus, to
expand this critique to the body of Neufeld’s work is indeed inappropriate.
excluding knowledge(s) and practice(s) of a modern(ed) International Relations, post-positivist space
clearing projects work to (re)ontologize International Relations and consequentially (re)affirm excluding
and marginalizing knowledge(s) and practice(s) that are not properly modern(ed). 
Reflecting
As mentioned, the above discussion has rested on the possibility of neutral discourse, in order to
demonstrate that Neufeld is (re)asserting a modern(ed) notion. This is indeed highly problematic because
this treatment contradicts both Neufeld’s and my own commitments which work to challenge the
neutrality of discourse(s). So as not to be caught in a contradiction, I want to assert that this was done for
both heuristic and ironic purposes in order to bolster the arguments of this paper. However, beyond my
own politico-normative goals, this discussion may have inappropriately expropriated – read in/out –
Neufeld’s intentions. As such, I believe it is important to undertake an overtly reflecting exercise.
For example, Neufeld’s intentions may not be all that different from my own, in that he is providing a
heuristic and ironic argument that not only creates a space to speak, but also creates a space to be heard.
This gains credence when considering that, “[r]iven with various demands, insistences, and assertions
that things ‘must’ be either this or that, this disposition is the most common metatheoretical discourse
amongst practitioners of the discipline of international relations.”63 Similarly, it is highly probable that
Neufeld is also constrained by the limits of discourse in that “familiarity may have bred contempt but has
not made it any easier to escape” the “tenacious grasp” of a dichotomized discourse.64 Thus, in order to
speak and to be heard, Neufeld explicitly/implicitly believes that he must employ a dichotomized
discourse because it is what has dominated and continues to be the dominant discourse of International
Relations.65 If indeed this is what Neufeld intended, the arguments of this paper are perhaps a little
overzealous.
It is therefore ironic that these reflective possibilities do not appear as a sentence, paragraph, or
footnote in Neufeld’s work.66 Such reflecting absence works to (re)open space for my critique that
Neufeld is purporting a moderned notion that indeed challenges a marginalizing aspect of moderned
International Relations, but does not challenge the marginalizing aspects of International Relations as a
moderned notion. As such, I believe that Neufeld’s claim, “it is only by exposing the limitations of
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67 Neufeld , The Restructuring of International Relations Theory , 24.
68 These knowledge(s) and practice(s) include aboriginal/indigenous cosmologies and life-ways, (deep) ecological
meta-physics, and religions such as Buddhism. However, I do recognize that I have not provided reasons for why
this knowledge(s) and practice(s) should be included within the realm of International Relations. Moreover, I have
also not made any pertinent suggestions regarding the formulation of notions, which are not properly modern(ed).
Nonetheless, these issues are beyond the bounds, which I have set for this paper. My goal was to explicitly engage
Neufeld and post-positivist articulations. However, where possible I have provided resources that deal with the
contentions that I have raised. As such, I guide the reader to  see, David Kinsley, Ecology and Religion Ecology
Spirituality in Cross-Cultural Perspective, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995); Sim on D alby, Environmental
Security, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); George J. Sefa Dei, Budd L. Hall, and Dorothy
Goldin Rosenberg , eds., Indigenous Knowledges in Global Contexts Multiple Readings o f Our World, (Toronto:
Unvirsity of Toronto Press, 2000); and David Bedford, and Thom W orkman, “The Great Law of Peace: Alternative
Inter-Nation(al) Practices and the Iroquoian Confederacy,” Alternatives, 22 (1997), 87-110 for engaged discussion
of the critiques raised in this paper.
positivism that a space can be created for alternative forms of theorizing about international politics”67
works to (re)essentialize the limiting, excluding, and marginalizing process of International Relations.
The resultant effect is a (re)modernizing of the space in which ‘alternative forms of theorizing’ takes
place; thereby (re)limiting, (re)excluding, and (re)marginalizing knowledge(s) and practice(s) which are
not properly modern(ed).68
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